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1. Introduction 
 
We cannot acquire, all by ourselves, all of the knowledge that we need to live 
our lives.  We often have to rely on information that we receive from others 
(cf. Hume 1977 [1748], 74).  For instance, we learn much of what we know 
about the world from books, newspapers, television, and the Internet. 
However, when we get information from others, we have to consider the 
possibility that they might be trying to deceive us (cf. Hume 1977 [1748], 77).  
For instance, politicians, corporations, and governments (and sometimes even 
reporters themselves) have certainly used the media to deceive the public (cf. 
Jackson and Jamieson 2007).  And in the very early days of the World Wide 
Web, Luciano Floridi (1996) already recognized the potential it had for 
misleading people (cf. Wachbroit 2000).  
In order to avoid being misled by such information sources, it is helpful to 
know exactly what we are dealing with.  In particular, what is 
disinformation?  Floridi (1996, 2005, 2011) has dealt with this question several 
times, and his views have evolved over the years.  In this essay, I describe the 
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three accounts of disinformation that Floridi has offered.  But I argue that, 
while Floridi has been getting closer to an adequate account of 
disinformation, he has not yet been successful.  Each of his accounts is too 
broad (i.e., it counts as disinformation things that clearly are not 
disinformation) and/or too narrow (i.e., it fails to count as disinformation 
things that clearly are disinformation).1 
 
 
2. False Information is Not Information 
 
Floridi is certainly the foremost philosopher of information in the world.  In 
addition, while philosophers as far back as Plato have done work in this area, 
Floridi deserves credit for first identifying it as an important subdiscipline of 
philosophy.  And one of his main tasks in this area has been to say what 
information is.  Before we get to his accounts of disinformation, we first need 
to look briefly at Floridi‟s account of information.  This is necessary because, 
for Floridi, disinformation is defined in terms of information.   
Basically, information is “well-formed, meaningful and truthful data” 
(Floridi 2011, 80).  “On weekends Luciano took the train in from Oxford to 
see Francesca” is an example of a piece of information.2  By contrast, “Twas 
brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe” and “Bill 
Clinton did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky” do 
not count as information.  (The first because it is not meaningful and the 
second because it is not truthful.)  
The most controversial element of his account of information, and the 
element that is most relevant for our purposes here, is that information must 
be true.  Several noted philosophers (e.g., Dretske 1981, 45-46, Grice 1989 
[1987], 371, Frické 1997, 887-90) agree with Floridi that “false information” 
is a contradiction in terms.  According to Fred Dretske (1983, 57), “false 
                                                 
1 It may not be possible to give an account that captures everyone‟s intuitions about 
disinformation.  In particular, there may be borderline cases that people disagree about.  
But I argue that Floridi‟s accounts do not even get some uncontroversial cases right. 
2 See Jonathan Harr‟s 2005 nonfiction book, The Lost Painting, for further information 
about Luciano and Francesca. 
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information, misinformation, and (grimace!) disinformation are not varieties 
of information—any more than a decoy duck is a kind of duck.” 
But there are other philosophers (e.g., Fox 1983, 157, Fetzer 2004a, 
Scarantino and Piccinini 2010) who argue that any meaningful data counts as 
information.  Moreover, Scarantino and Piccinini (2010, 323-26) point out 
that computer scientists and cognitive scientists use the term information in a 
way that does not require that it be true.  Similarly, when information 
scientists say that a library is full of information, they do not mean to be 
referring to just that subset of the collection that happens to be true. 
My own preference is to say that information need not be true.  When we 
get some stuff from an information source, we have definitely received some 
information; we just do not yet know whether or not it is true.  But I am also 
inclined to think that the debate about the status of “false information” is (no 
pun intended) just a matter of semantics.  So, for purposes of this essay, I will 
follow Floridi and talk about “semantic content” (i.e., meaningful data) when 
the stuff in question is not necessarily true. 
 
 
3. The Process of Information is Defective (1996) 
 
According to Floridi‟s (1996, 509) first account, “disinformation arises 
whenever the process of information is defective.”  Roughly speaking, 
disinformation occurs if semantic content is altered at some point in “its 
lifecycle (creation, storage, retrieval, updating)” in a way that makes it more 
likely that people will be misled.  This account captures prototypical 
instances of disinformation, such as fraud, hoaxes, and government 
propaganda.  But in addition, things like censorship are also disinformation 
on this account.  In fact, Floridi (1996, 510) even claims that “each form of 
disinformation need not necessarily be intentional.”  Thus, honest mistakes, 
such as The Chicago Tribune‟s erroneous report that “Dewey Defeats 
Truman” in 1948, are disinformation on this account. 
While we certainly have to be concerned with any type of semantic 
content that is defective, this account of disinformation seems to be too 
broad.  That is, there are examples of semantic content, that it counts as 
disinformation, but that are not disinformation.  Most researchers (e.g., 
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Fetzer 2004b, Jackson and Jamieson 2007) take the term disinformation to 
pick out, specifically, semantic content that is intentionally misleading.3  In 
fact, the American Heritage Dictionary defines it as “deliberately misleading 
information” and the Oxford English Dictionary defines it as “the 
dissemination of deliberately false information.”  So, it seems that honest 
mistakes should not count as disinformation. 
In any event, in order to avoid being misled by information sources, it is 
important for us to understand the various different types of defective 
semantic content.  In particular, we should at least distinguish between 
semantic content that is accidentally defective (misinformation) and semantic 
content that is intended to be defective (disinformation).  After all, the clues 
that suggest that someone is lying to us are different from the clues that 
suggest that she just does not know what she is talking about. 
In addition, even though the manipulation of “the process of 
information” is intentional in the case of censorship, it should probably not 
count as disinformation either.  Withholding information usually just keeps 
people in ignorance.  For instance, several repressive regimes have recently 
censored (or even shut down) the Internet to keep their citizens ignorant of 
protests going on in their own or other countries.  Admittedly, it is possible to 
actually deceive people by withholding information (e.g., so as to preserve 
false beliefs that would be overturned if people had access to the 
information).  But even so, simply withholding information seems very 
different from actually creating or spreading disinformation. 
 
 
4. The Source is Aware of its Nature (2005) 
 
With his second account of disinformation, Floridi (2005, section 3.2.3) does 
attempt to characterize a more specific type of defective semantic content.  
He writes that “when semantic content is false, this is a case of misinformation 
(Fox [1983]). And if the source of misinformation is aware of its nature, one 
                                                 
3 That is, the semantic content is likely to mislead the particular people that it is intended 
to mislead.  Semantic content can still be disinformation even if there are all sorts of other 
people (e.g., the Amazing Randi‟s of the world) who are not likely to be misled. 
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may speak of disinformation, as when one says to the mechanic „my husband 
forgot to turn the lights off.‟”  
Now, it is pretty clear that false semantic content can be disinformation 
even if the immediate source of the semantic content is not aware that it is 
false.  For instance, prior to the Falklands War, the British Ministry of 
Defense convinced reporters that there were no plans for a Normandy-style 
invasion of the islands (cf. Jackson and Jamieson 2007, 99-100).  
Nevertheless, these reporters clearly passed along disinformation to the 
British public (and to the Argentineans) even though they themselves were 
not aware that it was false.  So, I think that we have to assume that Floridi 
means that false semantic content is disinformation if the original source (in 
this case, the British Ministry of Defense) is aware that it is false. 
However, even with this clarification, Floridi‟s 2005 account of 
disinformation is still too broad.  Unless semantic content is likely to cause 
people to acquire a false belief, it is not all that epistemically dangerous, and 
it does not deserve to be called disinformation.  As I argue below, Floridi‟s 
2005 account does not even insure that disinformation is misleading, much 
less that it is intentionally misleading.   
Even if a speaker is aware that what he is saying is false, the semantic 
content is not necessarily misleading.  For instance, as Marc Antony was 
aware, the conspirators who assassinated Julius Caesar were not all honorable 
men.  Even so, Antony was not spreading disinformation when he said 
sarcastically that the conspirators were “all honourable men.”  The Roman 
people were not likely to believe that the conspirators were honorable men on 
the basis of his statement.  Similarly, people today are unlikely to believe the 
report in The Onion that “Al Gore Places Infant Son in Rocket to Escape 
Dying Planet.”4  Thus, this is not an example of disinformation either. 
                                                 
4 Likewise, the plaque on Tanque Verde Road in Tucson, Arizona that describes the “Sand 
Trout (Salmo Harenatus). Endemic to the dry washes of Southern Arizona, this fish is able 
to withstand extreme heat and the absence of water. It has become adept at swimming 
around in the sand, feeding on scorpions, sand lions, and juvenile horned toads. In spring, 
breeding males become brightly colored, with red on the fins, belly, cheeks and lips. The 
fine spots on the sand trout‟s body help break up its outline, protecting it from predators, 
but making it vulnerable to passing automobiles” is not disinformation even though a few 
gullible pedestrians might believe it. 
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By saying something false, Antony was actually trying to convey to the 
Roman people something true (viz., that the conspirators were not honorable 
men).  And The Onion was just making a joke.  But even if a speaker actually 
intends to communicate something false, the semantic content is still not 
necessarily misleading.  For example, in his 1875 novel, The Way We Live 
Now, Anthony Trollope writes that “when Sir Felix swore that a policeman 
was holding him while Crumb was beating him, no one believed him.  In such 
cases the liar does not expect to be believed.  He knows that his disgrace will 
be made public, and only hopes to be saved from the ignominy of declaring it 
with his own words.”  Unlike Antony and The Onion, Sir Felix was lying, but 
it is not clear that he was spreading disinformation as no one would be fooled 
by his statement. 
False statements that are not intended to deceive are known as bald-faced 
lies.  Such statements can certainly be dangerous.  For instance, if Sir Felix 
had been a more respectable member of the gentry, people might have had to 
take his false accusation seriously, and an innocent policeman might have 
gotten into trouble.  However, bald-faced lies are unlikely to cause anyone to 
acquire a false belief. 
Admittedly, any false statement can potentially mislead someone.  For 
instance, many first time readers of The Onion think (at least for a few 
moments) that it is a real newspaper.  But honest mistakes can also mislead 
people even though they are not intended to.  For instance, after reading the 
paper on the morning of November 3rd, many Chicago residents probably 
believed that Thomas Dewey had been elected President.  Indeed, even (true) 
information can mislead people if they misread it or mishear it.  So, the mere 
fact that there is some chance that someone will acquire a false belief from 
some semantic content is not enough to make it a piece of disinformation. 
 
 
5. It is Purposefully Conveyed to Mislead (2011) 
 
Most recently, Floridi (2011, 260) has argued that “misinformation is „well-
formed and meaningful data (i.e. semantic content) that is false.‟ 
„Disinformation‟ is simply misinformation purposefully conveyed to mislead 
the receiver into believing that it is information.”  On this account, 
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disinformation is essentially the same thing as a lie.  According to a standard 
philosophical account of lying, you lie if you say something that you believe 
to be false with the intent to deceive.5 
This account of disinformation is very close to the dictionary definitions.  
In addition, James Fetzer (2004b, 231) has claimed that disinformation 
“should be viewed more or less on a par with acts of lying. Indeed, the parallel 
with lying appears to be fairly precise.”  In fact, this equivalence is also 
suggested by George Carlin‟s trenchant remark above and by the very title of 
Russ Kick‟s 2001 book, You Are Being Lied to: The Disinformation Guide to 
Media Distortion, Historical Whitewashes and Cultural Myths. 
Unlike his previous account, Floridi‟s 2011 account rules out sarcastic 
remarks, jokes, and bald-faced lies.  But it is probably still too broad.  This 
account requires that the semantic content is intended to be misleading.  But 
it does not insure that the semantic content actually is misleading.6  For 
instance, imagine that eight year-old Billy has come to believe (from listening 
to his parents) that Paul Krugman and his ideas are a serious threat to our 
economy and our way of life.  So, he decides to discredit Krugman by 
spreading some disinformation.  With this in mind, he posts “Paul Krugman 
has cooties” on Krugman‟s blog at the New York Times.  Billy is 
sophisticated enough to know that Krugman does not really have cooties 
(that there is no such thing), but he hopes to mislead Krugman‟s readers.  
Thus, on Floridi‟s 2011 account, Billy‟s post counts as disinformation.  
However, while Billy is certainly trying to create disinformation, he fails to 
do so because his post is not misleading at all.  No one reading Krugman‟s 
blog is going to acquire the false belief that Krugman has cooties. 
 
 
6. Floridi’s Most Recent Account is Too Narrow 
 
In addition to being too broad, Floridi‟s 2011 account of disinformation is 
also too narrow.  That is, there are examples of semantic content, that it does 
                                                 
5 On this account of lying, bald-faced lies are not really lies (just as decoy ducks are not 
really ducks). 
6 While lies have to be intended to mislead (on the standard philosophical account), they 
do not have to actually be misleading. 
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not count as disinformation, but that really are disinformation.  In fact, as I 
argue below, it rules out four distinct types of semantic content that deserve 
to be called disinformation. 
 
 
7. Visual Disinformation 
 
Like Christopher Fox (1983, 75), Floridi (2011, 82) focuses on “declarative, 
semantic information.”  But images can also be used to convey information.  
For instance, a photograph or a map can show you that “the Bronx is up and 
the Battery‟s down.” 
Moreover, images can be used to convey semantic content that is false as 
well as semantic content that is true.  For instance, during the 2004 
Presidential campaign, a photograph appeared to show John Kerry and Jane 
Fonda sharing the stage at an anti-Vietnam war rally.  But it was really a 
composite of two separate photographs taken at two separate events (cf. 
Farid 2009, 98).  Also, in order to protect their intellectual property, many 
cartographers add a few features to their maps that do not really exist in the 
world (cf. Monmonier 1991, 49-51).  If these non-existent features show up in 
another map of the same area, the cartographer has good evidence that her 
work has been copied. 
While you have to use words in order to lie, these examples suggest that 
images by themselves can be disinformation.  In addition, misleading images 
might even be more epistemically dangerous than misleading words.  For 
instance, people generally take photographs to be more compelling evidence 
than mere testimony.  When we trust testimony, we know that we are 
putting our faith in the person who produced it.  By contrast, a photograph 
has evidential value independent of the intentions of the person who 
produced it (cf. Moran 2005, 8-11). 
Now, Floridi might claim that he does not mean to suggest that visual 
information is not information or that visual disinformation is not 
disinformation.  In fact, Floridi (2011, 84) does mention in passing that maps 
can count as information.  But his focus on textual information certainly 
tends to underplay this important type of disinformation. 
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8. True Disinformation 
 
Since disinformation is a subset of misinformation on Floridi‟s 2011 account, 
disinformation must be false.  However, there may be some disinformation 
that is literally true.  For instance, during the 2009 debate over healthcare 
legislation, several opponents claimed that the law mandated “death panels.”  
The law did make provisions (a) for optional end-of-life counseling and (b) for 
a group that would do cost-benefit analyses of medical treatments (cf. 
Rutenberg and Calmes 2009).  So, there is a sense in which the law did 
mandate “death panels.”  But of course, the law did not require forced 
euthanasia, which is the false conclusion many people drew and that the 
opponents of the legislation intended them to draw.7  Similarly, a television 
commercial that pitted Black Flag Roach Killer against another leading brand 
misled viewers about the effectiveness of Black Flag without showing 
anything that was literally false.  According to Thomas Carson (2002, 189), 
“the demonstration used roaches that had been bred to be resistant to the 
type of poison used by the competitor.” 
Even if one agrees with Floridi that information must be true, these 
examples suggest that there may be some disinformation that is information.  
In addition, true semantic content that is intended to be misleading might 
even be more epistemically dangerous than false semantic content (cf. 
Schauer and Zeckhauser 2009, 44-46).  At the very least, such disinformation 
is likely to be more prevalent than disinformation that is actually false.  
There is less of a social stigma against misleading people than there is against 
out-and-out lying to them.  Also, if you do not actually say anything false, it 
is more difficult to prove that you were trying to mislead anyone.  So, would-
be deceivers have some incentive to stick to the truth, if they can, while still 
deceiving. 
 
 
9. Side Effect Disinformation 
 
As I noted above, honest mistakes should not count as disinformation.  But 
even so, there may be some disinformation that is not intended by the source 
                                                 
7 Of course, some people did out-and-out lie about the law requiring forced euthanasia. 
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to be misleading (as Floridi‟s 2011 account requires).  Before I give an 
example, however, it is helpful to note that someone can be aware that some 
state of affairs is likely to be a consequence of her action even though she does 
not intend to bring about that consequence.  For instance, if a general orders 
the bombing of a military base and she is aware that some civilians living 
nearby will be killed, she still may not intend to kill civilians.  If the death of 
the civilians is not a means to achieving her ends (e.g., taking out the military 
base), it is only a very unfortunate “side effect” of the bombing (cf. McIntyre 
2009). 
In a similar vein, someone might intentionally create semantic content 
that is misleading, but not intend that anyone actually be misled.  The case of 
the cartographer who inserts small errors into her maps comes close to being 
an example of this kind of disinformation.  She does not intend to deceive the 
vast majority of the people who use her maps.  If legitimate users are misled, 
it is just an unfortunate side effect of her scheme to protect her intellectual 
property.  However, the cartographer does at least intend to deceive potential 
intellectual property thieves.8   
But there are others examples where there is no intent to deceive at all.  
For instance, researchers have put false semantic content into Wikipedia to 
see how long it takes to get corrected.  Also, educators have created websites 
with false semantic content (e.g., about the plight of the Pacific Northwest 
Tree Octopus) in order to teach people how to distinguish accurate from 
inaccurate semantic content on the Internet (cf. Wachbroit 2000, 10).  But 
neither of these groups intend to deceive anyone.  It is not a means to their 
ends.  In the case of the researchers, they just want to see whether or not 
people are deceived.  And in the case of the educators, they probably hope 
that no one (especially their students) is deceived. 
Now, the creation of false semantic content for purposes of research or 
education may be morally justified.  But that does not mean that the 
semantic content is not disinformation.  In fact, the dissemination of 
disinformation can be morally justified even if it is intended to deceive.  For 
instance, it was presumably acceptable for the Allies to try to fool the 
                                                 
8 Of course, she does not know for sure that there is anybody looking to steal her work, and 
actually hopes that there is no such person. 
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Germans and the Italians with false messages and documents during the 
Second World War (cf. Rankin 2008). 
 
 
10. Evolutionary Disinformation 
 
Finally, there may even be some disinformation that is not even foreseen by 
the source to be misleading.  Before I give an example, however, it is helpful 
to note that someone (or something) can deceive even though she has no 
intent to deceive (cf. Skyrms 1990, 72-82).  For instance, there are species of 
insects that have evolved to look like sticks or to look like leaves.  These 
insects certainly do not form any intentions with regard to the beliefs of 
potential predators.  For example, they do not intend that potential predators 
believe that they are flora rather than fauna because of what they look like.  
However, it is no accident that potential predators are fooled.  The deceptive 
camouflage gives these insects an adaptive advantage.  In particular, they are 
less likely to be eaten.  Thus, the deceptive camouflage is more likely to 
continue into the future (because the genes that create it will be passed on to 
future generations). 
Now, the appearance of an insect is not semantic content.  Thus, such 
deceptive camouflage is not disinformation.  But the same sort of thing can 
occur with misleading words (or images) as well as with misleading 
appearances.  For instance, the story of the virgin birth is arguably an 
example of disinformation of this kind.  Virgin births are impossible, or at 
least highly improbable (cf. Jurgensen and Southworth 2010).9  But the 
people that tell this story believe that it is true.  So, they do not intend to 
deceive anyone.  However, as in the stick insect case, the spreading of this 
falsehood is reinforced by several actual benefits that come from the 
falsehood being believed.  One such benefit was pointed out by David Hume 
(1977 [1748], 78).  People tend to experience an “agreeable emotion,” a sense 
of “surprise and wonder,” when they hear that a miracle has occurred.  As a 
result, the people describing the miracle to them can take “delight in exciting 
the admiration of others.”  Thus, the story of the virgin birth is more likely to 
                                                 
9 If you believe that the story of the virgin birth is true, insert your favorite myth from 
another culture here. 
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be told again in the future.  This kind of disinformation arguably has the 
purpose (or telos) of misleading people even though people are not misled on 
purpose (as Floridi‟s 2011 account requires).10 
 
 
11. Conclusion 
 
None of Floridi‟s three accounts quite capture the critical characteristic of 
disinformation: viz., that it is intentionally misleading.  His most recent 
account comes closest to doing so.  Unfortunately, this account of 
disinformation is too restrictive.  In particular, it rules out visual 
disinformation, true disinformation, side effect disinformation, and 
evolutionary disinformation.11  So, while Floridi has taken us a long way in 
the right direction, it is not yet clear that we have an adequate account of 
what disinformation is.  Of course, philosophers have been trying to say what 
knowledge is for over two thousand years, and still have not gotten that right 
(cf. Feldman 2003).  So, since the term disinformation was only coined about 
fifty years ago, and Floridi has only been trying to define it for fifteen, it is 
early days yet. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Even in this case, there could be someone who intends people to be misled, such as an 
extremely powerful being who makes sure that those people who tell the story of the virgin 
birth are surreptitiously rewarded and encouraged.  But as long as this being does not tell 
the story himself and did not come up with the story in the first place, the source of the 
semantic content does not intend it to be misleading.  Similarly, we can imagine a powerful 
newspaper publisher who would like the public to believe falsely in the existence of a 
dangerous international conspiracy.  But instead of instructing her editors and reporters to 
publish false semantic content about this conspiracy, she simply hires the relevant 
conspiracy theorists as editors and reporters and lets them publish whatever they like.  
Since the publisher does not control exactly what semantic content is published in the 
newspaper, it is the editors and reporters who are the source, and they believe that it is 
true and not at all misleading.  Even so, it seems like her newspaper is publishing 
disinformation. 
11 Floridi‟s original 1996 account captures all four of the counter-examples to his most 
recent account.  But as I have argued, that account is clearly too broad. 
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